Articles & Contributions
“Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien (Somalie c. Kenya) : l’arrêt sur le fond rendu le 12 octobre 2021”
“Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya): the judgment on the merits of 12 October 2021”
Annuaire français de Droit international 67 (2021).
The judgment of the International Court of Justice delivered on 12 October 2021 settles the substantive issues in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean between Somalia and Kenya. The case was marked by a chaotic final phase of the proceedings, a delayed oral hearing and the non-appearance of Kenya. On the substance, the Court’s judgment remains classic and constitutes an important confirmation of the existing international case law on maritime delimitation, including the question of state responsibility for activities in disputed maritime spaces. Nevertheless, the decision raises some questions and issues, in particular with regard to the concrete application of the delimitation methodology and the delimitation of the portion of the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.
L’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice rendu le 12 octobre 2021 tranche les questions de fond dans l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien entre la Somalie et le Kenya. L’affaire a été marquée par une fin de procédure chaotique, une procédure orale retardée et la non-comparution du Kenya. Sur le fond, l’arrêt de la Cour reste classique et constitue une confirmation importante de la jurisprudence internationale en matière de délimitation maritime, y compris en ce qui concerne la question de la responsabilité d’un État en raison d’activités menées dans les espaces marins contestés. La décision soulève néanmoins quelques interrogations et problèmes, notamment en ce qui concerne l’application concrète de la méthode de délimitation et la délimitation de la partie du plateau continental au-delà de la limite de 200 milles marins.
“Ad hoc investment arbitration based on State contracts: from Lena Goldfields to the Libyan oil arbitrations”
“Ad hoc investment arbitration based on State contracts: from Lena Goldfields to the Libyan oil arbitrations”
International Investment Law: An Analysis of the Major Decisions. Edited by H. Ruiz Fabri and E. Stoppioni.
Studies in International Trade and Investment Law 27. Oxford: Hart, 2022.
p. 21-35.
“L’éthique des parties au contentieux d’investissement”
“The ethics of parties in investment litigation”
Le droit international des investissements au prisme de l’éthique. Edited by R. Maurel.
Travaux du Centre de recherche sur le droit des marchés et des investissements internationaux, 58. Paris: LexisNexis, 2021.
p. 193-210.
Commentary of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
Commentary of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
With Alain Pellet.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary. Edited by A. Zimmermann and Ch. J. Tams. 3rd edn.
Oxford Commentaries on International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
p. 819-962.
“Droits et obligations issus du droit de l’investissement et des droits de l’homme : entre exclusivité et harmonisation”
“Rights and obligations under investment law and human rights law: between exclusivity and harmonization”
With Gisèle Stephens-Chu.
Droit de l’Homme et droit international économique. Edited by C. Titi.
Bruylant, 2019.
p. 223-49.
“The Saga of the 1858 Treaty of Limits: The Cases Against Costa Rica”
“The Saga of the 1858 Treaty of Limits: The Cases Against Costa Rica”
Nicaragua Before the International Court of Justice. Edited by E. Sobenes Obregon and B. Samson.
New York, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2018.
p. 85-112.
The Treaty of Limits concluded between Nicaragua and Costa Rica in 1858 was aimed at determining the land boundary along the San Juan River and at establishing a specific regime of navigational rights in respect of part of this river. It became the source of constant differences and disputes between the two States. Some of these disputes concerning the interpretation and the application of the 1858 Treaty were submitted to arbitration in the late nineteenth century and to the Central American Court of Justice in the early twentieth century. Since 2005, both States have submitted four cases to the International Court of Justice concerning the course of the boundary determined in the 1858 Treaty and the scope of the navigational rights granted within this instrument.
The Treaty of Limits concluded between Nicaragua and Costa Rica in 1858 was aimed at determining the land boundary along the San Juan River and at establishing a specific regime of navigational rights in respect of part of this river. It became the source of constant differences and disputes between the two States. Some of these disputes concerning the interpretation and the application of the 1858 Treaty were submitted to arbitration in the late nineteenth century and to the Central American Court of Justice in the early twentieth century. Since 2005, both States have submitted four cases to the International Court of Justice concerning the course of the boundary determined in the 1858 Treaty and the scope of the navigational rights granted within this instrument.
“L’extraterritorialité du droit pénal et les sanctions”
“Extraterritoriality of criminal law and sanctions”
With Alexandra van der Meulen and Ben Juratowitch QC.
La souveraineté pénale de l’État au XXIème siècle, S.F.D.I., Colloque de Lille.
Paris: Pedone, 2018.
p. 487-500.
“La prétendue requête de la Bosnie-Herzégovine demandant la révision de l’arrêt du 26 février 2007 en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie) :
Le refus de la Cour d’inscrire l’affaire au rôle”
“The purported application of Bosnia and Herzegovina requesting the revision of the Judgment of 26 February 2007 in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia): The Court’s refusal to enter the case on the General List”
Annuaire français de Droit international 63 (2017): 205-16.
Le 23 février 2017, un document intitulé « Demande en revision de l’arrêt du 26 février 2007 en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie) » a été reçu par la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour a refusé l’inscription au rôle de cette demande en révision. Les raisons de ce refus et la position de la Cour ont été expliquées par le président de celle-ci dans une déclaration publiée dans un communiqué de presse du 9 mars 2017. La présente contribution revient sur les faits et les explications sur lesquels la position de la Cour est fondée, tenant à la question de la représentation des États dans une affaire donnée, ainsi que sur la forme très peu habituelle de cette décision.
On 23 February 2017, the International Court of Justice received a document entitled “Application for revision of the judgment of 26 February 2007 in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia)”. The Court refused to enter this application for revision on the General List. The reasons for this refusal and the Court’s position were explained by the President of the Court in a statement published in a press release of 9 March 2017. This contribution discusses the facts and justifications for the Court’s position, concerning principally the issue of representation of a State in a given case, as well as the very unusual circumstances in which the Court refused to accept the request on the General List and communicated this publicly.
“The Question Question” (Chapter 7)
“The Question Question” (Chapter 7)
The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. Edited by Sir Michael Wood and M. Milanovic.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
p. 118-33.
This chapter examines the question submitted to the International Court of Justice by General Assembly resolution 63/3. Although the Court considered that the question was clearly formulated, it extensively discussed its scope and its formulation. The Court refused to broaden the scope of the question submitted to it and to address issues related to the conformity of the declaration of independence with international law, like Kosovo’s statehood or the consequences of the many recognitions of Kosovo. However, the Court corrected the formulation of the question in regard to the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence. It further interpreted the question in a rather narrow way to cover only whether the declaration of independence itself violated international law.
This chapter examines the question submitted to the International Court of Justice by General Assembly resolution 63/3. Although the Court considered that the question was clearly formulated, it extensively discussed its scope and its formulation. The Court refused to broaden the scope of the question submitted to it and to address issues related to the conformity of the declaration of independence with international law, like Kosovo’s statehood or the consequences of the many recognitions of Kosovo. However, the Court corrected the formulation of the question in regard to the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence. It further interpreted the question in a rather narrow way to cover only whether the declaration of independence itself violated international law.
“Le prix de la vie humaine en droit international : La réparation des dommages en cas de pertes de vies humaines dans la responsabilité internationale”
“The price of human life in international law: Reparation for damages in case of loss of human lifes in the law of State responsibility”
Annuaire français de Droit international 60 (2014): 429-65.
L’obligation de réparer le préjudice causé par un fait internationalement illicite est solidement ancrée dans le droit de la responsabilité internationale. Mais peut-on réparer l’irréparable, à savoir la perte d’une vie humaine en raison d’une violation des obligations internationales attribuable à un État ? Il est logiquement impossible d’indemniser la vie perdue en tant que telle en raison de la caractéristique et des conséquences de ce préjudice fatal. Pour cette raison, la vie ne peut pas avoir de « prix » intrinsèque. Néanmoins, la pratique jurisprudentielle et arbitrale a consacré des solutions permettant d’offrir une compensation à certains proches du défunt, voire à l’État de nationalité de ce dernier, pour leurs dommages respectifs.
It is well established in the law of State responsibility that a State is obliged to make full reparation for the injury caused by its internationally wrongful act. But is it also possible to provide reparation for the irreparable — a loss of human life caused by the violation of an international obligation attributable to a State ? Logically, compensation for lost life per se is impossible because of the peculiarities and the consequences of a fatal act. Therefore, life cannot have an inherent “price”. Nonetheless, judicial and arbitral practice have developed solutions offering compensation to surviving relatives, or to the deceased’s State of nationality, for their respective damages.
“Reservations and Time: Is there only one Right Moment to Formulate and to React to Reservations?”
“Reservations and Time: Is there only one Right Moment to Formulate and to React to Reservations?”
European Journal of International Law 24, no. 4 (2013): 1113-34.
Time is an important element in the process of reservations to treaties and, consequently, in the legal regime established by the Vienna Conventions for reservations and reactions thereto. The very definition of reservations, embodied in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, as well as in Article 2(1)(j) of the 1978 Vienna Convention, and incorporated in the definition adopted by the International Law Commission in its Guide to Practice, includes precise indications and limits concerning the moment in time for a reservation to be formulated. In practice, however, reservations have been made before and after this peculiar moment. The work of the International Law Commission has shown that these are still reservations, even if they are not contemplated by the Vienna regime. But they can nevertheless deploy their purported effects under some additional conditions. The same holds true with regard to objections to reservations which can be formulated prematurely or late. They are still objections even if their concrete legal effects may be affected. Whereas time is important for the legal consequences attached to reservations and reactions thereto, it plays a less important role in the overall process of reservations dialogue.
Time is an important element in the process of reservations to treaties and, consequently, in the legal regime established by the Vienna Conventions for reservations and reactions thereto. The very definition of reservations, embodied in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, as well as in Article 2(1)(j) of the 1978 Vienna Convention, and incorporated in the definition adopted by the International Law Commission in its Guide to Practice, includes precise indications and limits concerning the moment in time for a reservation to be formulated. In practice, however, reservations have been made before and after this peculiar moment. The work of the International Law Commission has shown that these are still reservations, even if they are not contemplated by the Vienna regime. But they can nevertheless deploy their purported effects under some additional conditions. The same holds true with regard to objections to reservations which can be formulated prematurely or late. They are still objections even if their concrete legal effects may be affected. Whereas time is important for the legal consequences attached to reservations and reactions thereto, it plays a less important role in the overall process of reservations dialogue.
“L’engagement de la responsabilité de l’Union européenne dans l’ordre juridique international”
“The establishment of the Internationally Wrongful Act of the European Union under International Law”
Union européenne et droit international : En honneur à Patrick Daillier. Edited by M. Benlolo-Carabot, U. Candas, and E. Cujo. Paris: Pedone, 2012.
p. 339-59.
Commentaries of Articles 20 and 21 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties
Commentaries of Articles 20 and 21 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties
The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary. Edited by O. Corten, and P. Klein.
Oxford Commentaries on International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
p. 489-567.
Commentaire article par article des Conventions de Vienne de 1969 et 1986 sur le droit des traités. Edited by O. Corten, and P. Klein. Brussels: Bruylant, 2006.
p. 797-934 (in French).
“Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Not an Absolute Evil …”
“Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Not an Absolute Evil …”
With Alain Pellet.
From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma. Edited by U. Fastenrath, R. Geiger, D. E. Khan, A. Paulus, S. von Schorlemer, and Ch. Vedder.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
p. 521-51.
This chapter on reservations to human rights has its place in a volume devoted to the evolution of international law from bilateralism to community interest. It could even be said that it is at the very heart of the dialectic called by these two trends: on the one hand, reservations, in a way, ‘bilateralize’ the relations between the parties to multilateral treaties while, at the same time, facilitating a wider acceptance of the core elements of the treaties in question and, therefore, strengthening the global community interest. This dialectic is vividly present with regard to human rights treaties even though, according to a dominant view among human rights activists, reservations to those treaties are seen as an absolute evil. They are not.
This chapter on reservations to human rights has its place in a volume devoted to the evolution of international law from bilateralism to community interest. It could even be said that it is at the very heart of the dialectic called by these two trends: on the one hand, reservations, in a way, ‘bilateralize’ the relations between the parties to multilateral treaties while, at the same time, facilitating a wider acceptance of the core elements of the treaties in question and, therefore, strengthening the global community interest. This dialectic is vividly present with regard to human rights treaties even though, according to a dominant view among human rights activists, reservations to those treaties are seen as an absolute evil. They are not.
“Reservations to Treaties: An Objection to a Reservation is Definitely not an Acceptance”
“Reservations to Treaties: An Objection to a Reservation is Definitely not an Acceptance”
With Alain Pellet.
The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention. Edited by E. Cannizzaro.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
p. 37-59.
The differences between the effects and implications of an acceptance of a reservation and of an objection to a reservation are quite easy to overlook, especially if one considers Articles 21(1) and 21(3) of the Vienna Convention in isolation. Nevertheless, in spite of some troubling similarities in specific circumstances, it cannot be denied that these differences do exist: an objection is not an acceptance and the effects of an acceptance or an objection must be distinguished in respect to the entry into force of the treaty, on the one hand, as well as to the relations between the parties if and when the treaty enters into force between them, regardless of whether the reservation is permissible, on the other hand.
The differences between the effects and implications of an acceptance of a reservation and of an objection to a reservation are quite easy to overlook, especially if one considers Articles 21(1) and 21(3) of the Vienna Convention in isolation. Nevertheless, in spite of some troubling similarities in specific circumstances, it cannot be denied that these differences do exist: an objection is not an acceptance and the effects of an acceptance or an objection must be distinguished in respect to the entry into force of the treaty, on the one hand, as well as to the relations between the parties if and when the treaty enters into force between them, regardless of whether the reservation is permissible, on the other hand.
Commentaire de l’article 48 du Pacte international pour les droits civils et politique de 1966
Commentary of Article 48 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques: Commentaire article par article. Edited by E. Decaux.
Paris: Economica, 2011.
p. 795-805.
“The Work of García Amador on State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens” (Chapter 8)
“The Iran-US Claims Tribunal” (Chapter 54.2)
“The Work of García Amador on State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens” (Chapter 8)
“The Iran-US Claims Tribunal” (Chapter 54.2)
The Law of International Responsibility. Edited by J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S. Olleson.
Oxford Commentaries on International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
p. 69-74 and 843-8.
Commentaire de l’article 15 (2) de la Charte des Nations unies
Commentary of Article 15 (2) of the United Nations Charter
(update)
La Charte des Nations Unies : Commentaire article par article. Edited by J.-P. Cot, A. Pellet, and M. Forteau. 3rd edn.
Paris: Economica, 2005.
p. 761-7.
“L’investissement étranger : Tentative d’identification” (Chapter 52)
“Foreign Investment: An Attempt of Indentification” (Chapter 52)
Droit international de l’économie. Edited by P. Daillier, G. de la Pradelle, and H. Ghérari.
Paris: Pedone, 2004.
p. 645-9.